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In 1996, a computer hacker allegedly associated with the White Supremacist movement 
temporarily disabled a Massachusetts Internet Service Provider and damaged part of the ISP=s 
record keeping system.  The ISP had attempted to stop the hacker from sending out worldwide 
racist messages under the ISP=s name.  The hacker signed off with the threat, “you have yet to 
see true electronic terrorism. This is a promise.” 
 
The hacker apparently never made good on his promise, but the threat of a cyberterrorist attack 
has many people worried. The highly acclaimed Computers at Risk  report (1991) from the 
National Research Council concludes “Tomorrow’s terrorist may be able to do more with a 
keyboard than with a bomb.” And Cybercrime, Cyberterrorims, and Cyberwarfare (1998) from 
the Global Organized Crime Project of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in 
Washington, DC says “Cyberterrorists, acting for rogue states or groups that have declared holy 
war against the United States, are known to be plotting America’s demise as a superpower.” 
 
What is Cyberterrorism? 
 
Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism.  It refers to unlawful attacks and 
threats of attack against computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to 
intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.  
Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against persons or 
property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear.  Attacks that lead to death or bodily 
injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples.  Serious attacks against critical 
infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact.  Attacks that disrupt 
nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not. 
 
Numerous scenarios have been suggested.  In one, a cyberterrorist attacks the computer systems 
that control a large regional power grid.  Power is lost for a sustained period of time and people 
die.  In another, the cyberterrorist breaks into an air traffic control system and tampers with the 
system.  Two large civilian aircraft collide.  In a third, the cyberterrorist disrupts banks, 
international financial transactions, and stock exchanges.  Economic systems grind to a halt, the 
public loses confidence, and destabilization is achieved.  While none of these or similar scenarios 




Terrorists in Cyberspace 
 
Terrorists have moved into cyberspace to facilitate traditional forms of terrorism such as 
bombings.  They use the Internet to communicate, coordinate events, and advance their agenda. 
While such activity does not constitute cyberterrorism in the strict sense, it does show that 
terrorists have some competency using the new information technologies.   
 
By 1996, the headquarters of terrorist financier Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan was equipped 
with computers and communications equipment.  Egyptian “Afghan” computer experts were said 
to have helped devise a communication network that used the Web, e-mail, and electronic 
bulletin boards.  Hamas activists have been said to use chat rooms and e-mail to plan operations 
and coordinate activities, making it difficult for Israeli security officials to trace their messages 
and decode their contents.  The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) uses e-mail 
to field inquiries from the press. 
 
The Web is especially popular as a medium for reaching a global audience.  For example, after 
the Peruvian terrorist group Tupac Amaru stormed the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima 
on December 17, 1996 and took 400 diplomatic, political, and military officials as hostage, 
sympathizers in the United States and Canada put up solidarity Web sites.  One site included 
detailed drawings of the residence and planned assault. 
 
In February 1998, Hizbullah was operating three Web sites: one for the central press office 
(www.hizbollah.org), another to describe its attacks on Israeli targets (www.moqawama.org), 
and the third for news and information (www.almanar.com.lb).  That month, Clark Staten, 
executive director of the Emergency Response & Research Institute (ERRI) in Chicago, testified 
before a U.S. Senate subcommittee that “even small terrorist groups are now using the Internet to 
broadcast their message and misdirect/misinform the general population in multiple nations 
simultaneously.” He gave the subcommittee copies of both domestic and international messages 
containing anti-American and anti-Israeli propaganda and threats, including a widely distributed 
extremist call for “jihad” (holy war) against America and Great Britain. 
 
In June 1998, U.S. News & World Report noted that 12 of the 30 groups on the U.S. State 
Department=s list of terrorist organizations are on the Web.  Now, it appears that virtually every 
terrorist group is on the Web.  Forcing them off the Web is impossible, because they can set up 
their sites in countries with free-speech laws.  The government of Sri Lanka, for example, 
banned the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, but they have not even attempted to take 
down their London-based Web site. 
   
Even in democracies, however, there are limits to what terrorists can post on the Net.  After a 
group of anti-abortionists put up a Web site terrorizing doctors who performed abortions, a 
federal jury ordered the pages be taken down and damages of more than $100 million paid.  The 
Nuremberg Files site had listed the names of about 200 abortion providers under the heading of 
“baby butchers.” Readers were invited to send in such personal details as the doctors’ home 
addresses, license plate numbers, and the names of their children.  Three doctors whose names 
appeared on the list were killed, and after each, the doctor’s name was promptly crossed out.  
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Doctors named on the site testified that they lived in constant fear and used disguises, 
bodyguards, and bulletproof vests.  In ordering the site down, the federal jury said the site and 
“wanted” posters amounted to death threats against the doctors. 
 
Many terrorists are using encryption to conceal their communications and stored files, 
compounding the difficulties of providing effective counter-terrorism. Hamas, for example, 
reportedly has used encrypted Internet communications to transmit maps, pictures, and other 
details pertaining to terrorist attacks. Ramsey Yousef, a member of the international terrorist 
group responsible for bombing the World Trade Center in 1994 and a Manila Air airliner in late 
1995, encrypted files on his laptop computer. The files, which U.S. government officials 
decrypted, contained information pertaining to further plans to blow up eleven U.S.-owned 
commercial airliners in the Far East. The Aum Shinrikyo cult, which gassed the Tokyo subway 
in March 1995, killing 12 people and injuring 6,000 more, also used encryption to protect their 
computerized records, which included plans and intentions to deploy weapons of mass 




Cyberspace is constantly under assault.  Cyber spies, thieves, saboteurs, and thrill seekers break 
into computer systems, steal personal data and trade secrets, vandalize Web sites, disrupt service, 
sabotage data and systems, launch computer viruses and worms, conduct fraudulent transactions, 
and harass individuals and companies.  These attacks are facilitated with increasingly powerful 
and easy-to-use software tools, which are readily available for free from thousands of Web sites 
on the Internet. 
 
Many of the attacks are serious and costly.  The ILOVEYOU virus and variants, for example, 
was estimated to have hit tens of millions of users worldwide and cost billions of dollars in 
damage.  Denial-of-service attacks against Yahoo, CNN, eBay, and other e-commerce Web sites 
were estimated to have caused over a billion in losses.  They also shook the confidence of 
business and individuals in e-commerce. 
 
Governments are particularly concerned with terrorist and state-sponsored attacks against the 
critical infrastructures that constitute their national life support systems.  The Clinton 
Administration defined eight: telecommunications, banking and finance, electrical power, oil and 
gas distribution and storage, water supply, transportation, emergency services, and government 
services. 
 
There have been numerous attacks against these infrastructures.  Hackers have invaded the 
public phone networks, compromising nearly every category of activity, including switching and 
operations, administration, maintenance, and provisioning (OAM&P).  They have crashed or 
disrupted signal transfer points, traffic switches, OAM&P systems, and other network elements.  
They have planted “time bomb” programs designed to shut down major switching hubs, 
disrupted emergency 911 services throughout the eastern seaboard, and boasted that they have 
the capability to bring down all switches in Manhattan.  They have installed wiretaps, rerouted 
phone calls, changed the greetings on voice mail systems, taken over voice mailboxes, and made 
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free long-distance calls at their victims= expense -- sticking some victims with phone bills in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.  When they can=t crack the technology, they use “social 
engineering” to con employees into giving them access. 
 
In March 1997, one teenage hacker penetrated and disabled a telephone company computer that 
serviced the Worcester Airport in Massachusetts.  As a result, telephone service to the Federal 
Aviation Administration control tower, the airport fire department, airport security, the weather 
service, and various private airfreight companies was cut off for six hours.  Later in the day, the 
juvenile disabled another telephone company computer, this time causing an outage in the 
Rutland area.  The lost service caused financial damages and threatened public health and public 
safety.  On a separate occasion, the hacker allegedly broke into a pharmacist=s computer and 
accessed files containing prescriptions.  
 
Banks and financial systems are a popular target of cyber criminals.  The usual motive is money, 
and perpetrators have stolen or attempted to steal tens of millions of dollars.  In one case of 
sabotage, a computer operator at Reuters in Hong Kong tampered with the dealing room systems 
of five of the company=s bank clients.  In November 1996, he programmed the systems to delete 
key operating system files after a delay long enough to allow him to leave the building.  When 
the “time bombs” exploded, the systems crashed.  They were partially restored by the next 
morning, but it took another day before they were fully operational.  However, the banks said the 
tampering did not significantly affect trading and that neither they nor their clients experienced 
losses. 
 
In another act of sabotage against a critical infrastructure, a fired employee of Chevron’s 
emergency alert network disabled the firm=s alert system by hacking into computers in New 
York and San Jose, California, and reconfiguring them so they=d crash.  The vandalism was not 
discovered until an emergency arose at the Chevron refinery in Richmond, California, and the 
system could not be used to notify the adjacent community of a noxious release.  During the 10-
hour period in 1992 when the system was down, thousands of people in 22 states and 6 
unspecified areas of Canada were put at risk. 
 
An overflow of raw sewage on the Sunshine Coast of Australia in June was linked to a 49-year-
old Brisbane man, who allegedly penetrated the Maroochy Shire Council’s computer system and 
used radio transmissions to create the overflows.  The man faced 370 charges that included 
stealing, computer hacking, and use radio communications equipment without authority. 
 
Government computers, particularly Department of Defense computers, are a regular target of 
attack.  Detected attacks against unclassified DoD computers rose from 780 in 1997 to 5,844 in 
1998 and 22,144 in 1999. 
 
The most damaging and costly attacks have been conducted for reasons other than the pursuit of 
terrorism.  As the above cases illustrate, they have been motivated by greed, thrills, ego, revenge, 
and a variety of other non-ideological factors.  They are properly classifified as cybercrimes, but 




Politically and Socially Motivated Cyberattacks 
 
Terrorism is normally associated with attacks conducted in furtherance of political and social 
objectives.  Numerous cyberattacks have been so motivated.  For example, in 1998, ethnic Tamil 
guerrillas swamped Sri Lankan embassies with 800 e-mails a day over a two-week period.  The 
messages read “We are the Internet Black Tigers and we=re doing this to disrupt your 
communications.” Intelligence authorities characterized it as the first known attack by terrorists 
against a country=s computer systems. 
 
Also in 1998, Spanish protestors bombarded the Institute for Global Communications (IGC) with 
thousands of bogus e-mail messages.  E-mail was tied up and undeliverable to the San Francisco 
based ISP=s users, and support lines were tied up with people who couldn=t get their mail.  The 
protestors also spammed IGC staff and member accounts, clogged their Web page with bogus 
credit card orders, and threatened to employ the same tactics against organizations using IGC 
services.  They demanded that IGC stop hosting the Webs site for the Euskal Herria Journal, a 
New York-based publication supporting Basque independence.  Protestors said IGC supported 
terrorism because a section on the Web pages contained materials on the terrorist group 
Fatherland and Liberty, or ETA, which claimed responsibility for assassinations of Spanish 
political and security officials, and attacks on military installations.  IGC finally relented and 
pulled the site because of the “mail bombings.” 
 
During the Kosovo conflict in 1999, NATO computers were blasted with e-mail bombs and hit 
with denial-of-service attacks by hacktivists protesting the NATO bombings.  In addition, 
businesses, public organizations, and academic institutes received highly politicized virus-laden 
e-mails from a range of Eastern European countries, according to reports.  Web defacements 
were also common.  After the Chinese Embassy was accidentally bombed in Belgrade, Chinese 
hacktivists posted messages such as “We won=t stop attacking until the war stops!” on U.S. 
government Web sites. 
 
Since December 1997, the Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT), a New York City based 
activist group, has been conducting Web sit-ins against various sites in support of the Mexican 
Zapatistas.  At a designated time, thousands of protestors point their browsers to a target site 
using software that floods the target with rapid and repeated download requests.  EDT=s 
software has also been used by animal rights groups against organizations said to abuse animals. 
 Electrohippies, another group of hacktivists, conducted Web sit-ins against the WTO when they 
met in Seattle in late 1999.  These sit-ins all require mass participation to have much effect, and 
thus are more suited to use by activists than by relatively small groups of terrorists operating in 
secrecy. 
 
While the above incidents were motivated by political and social reasons, whether they were 
sufficiently harmful or frightening to be classified as cyberterrorism is a judgement call.  To the 
best of my knowledge, no attack so far has led to violence or injury to persons, although some 
may have intimidated their victims.  Both EDT and the Electrohippies view their operations as 
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acts of civil disobedience, analogous to street protests and physical sit-ins, not as acts of violence 
or terrorism.  This is an important distinction.  Most activists, whether participating in a street 
march or Web sit-in, are not terrorists. 
 
However, there are a few indications that some terrorist groups are pursuing cyberterrorism, 
either alone or in conjunction with acts of physical violence.  In February 1998, Clark Staten told 
the Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government 
Information that it was believed that “members of some Islamic extremist organizations have 
been attempting to develop a ‘hacker network’ to support their computer activities and even 
engage in offensive information warfare attacks in the future.” 
 
In November 1998, the Detroit News reported that Khalid Ibrahim, who claimed to be a member 
of the militant Indian separatist group Harkat-ul-Ansar, had tried to buy military software from 
hackers who had stolen it from Department of Defense computers they had penetrated.  The 
attempted purchase was discovered when an 18-year-old hacker calling himself Chameleon 
attempted to cash a $1,000 check from Ibrahim.  Chameleon said he did not have the software 
and did not give it to Ibrahim, but Ibrahim may have obtained it or other sensitive information 
from one of the many other hackers he approached. Harkat-ul-Ansar declared war on the United 
States following the August cruise-missile attack on a suspected terrorist training camp in 
Afghanistan run by bin Laden, which allegedly killed nine of their members.   
 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army employed the services of contract hackers to penetrate 
computers in order to acquire home addresses of law enforcement and intelligence officers, but 
the data was used to draw up plans to kill the officers in a single “night of the long knives” if the 
British government did not meet terms for a new cease-fire.  As this case illustrates, terrorists 
may use hacking as a way of acquiring intelligence in support of physical violence, even if they 
do not use it to wreak havoc in cyberspace.  
 
Terrorists might also engage in computer network attacks as a way of financing physical 
operations.  For example, they could penetrate an e-commerce Web site and steal credit card 
numbers, conduct fraudulent transactions against an Internet bank, or extort money from victims 




To understand the potential threat of cyberterrorism, two factors must be considered: first, 
whether there are targets that are vulnerable to attack that could lead to violence or severe harm, 
and second, whether there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry them out. 
 
Looking first at vulnerabilities, several studies have shown that critical infrastructures are 
potentially vulnerable to cyberterrorist attack.  Eligible Receiver, a Ano notice@ exercise 
conducted by the Department of Defense in 1997 with support from National Security Agency 
penetration testing teams, found the power grid and emergency 911 systems had weaknesses that 
could be exploited by an adversary using only publicly available tools on the Internet.  Although 
neither of these systems were actually attacked, study members concluded that service on these 
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systems could be disrupted.  Also in 1997, the President=s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection issued its report warning that through mutual dependencies and interconnectedness, 
critical infrastructures could be vulnerable in new ways, and that vulnerabilities were steadily 
increasing, while the costs of attack were decreasing. 
 
Although many of the weaknesses in computerized systems can be corrected, it is effectively 
impossible to eliminate all of them.  Even if the technology itself offers good security, it is 
frequently configured or used in ways that make it open to attack.  In addition, there is always 
the possibility of insiders, acting alone or in concert with other terrorists, misusing their access 
capabilities.  According to Russia=s Interior Ministry Col. Konstantin Machabeli, the state-run 
gas monopoly, Gazprom, was hit by hackers in 1999 who collaborated with a Gazprom insider.  
The hackers were said to have used a Trojan horse to gain control of the central switchboard 
which controls gas flows in pipelines, although Gazprom, the world=s largest natural gas 
producer and the largest gas supplier to Western Europe, refuted the report. 
 
Consultants and contractors are frequently in a position where they could cause grave harm.   
This past March, Japan=s Metropolitan Police Department reported that a software system they 
had procured to track 150 police vehicles, including unmarked cars, had been developed by the 
Aum Shinryko cult.  At the time of the discovery, the cult had received classified tracking data 
on 115 vehicles.  Further, the cult had developed software for at least 80 Japanese firms and 10 
government agencies.  They had worked as subcontractors to other firms, making it almost 
impossible for the organizations to know who was developing the software.  As subcontractors, 
the cult could have installed Trojan horses to launch or facilitate cyberterrorist attacks at a later 
date.  Fearing a Trojan horse of their own, last February, the U.S. State Department sent an 
urgent cable to about 170 embassies asking them to remove software, which they belatedly 
realized had been written by citizens of the former Soviet Union. 
 
If we take as given that critical infrastructures are vulnerable to a cyberterrorist attack, then the 
question becomes whether there are actors with the capability and motivation to carry out such 
an operation.  While many hackers have the knowledge, skills, and tools to attack computer 
systems, they generally lack the motivation to cause violence or severe economic or social harm. 
Conversely, terrorists who are motivated to cause violence seem to lack the capability or 






In August 1999, the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, issued a report titled “Cyberterror: Prospects and 
Implications.”  Their objective was to articulate the demand side of terrorism.  Specifically, they 
assessed the prospects of terrorist organizations pursuing cyberterrorism.  They concluded that 
the barrier to entry for anything beyond annoying hacks is quite high, and that terrorists generally 
lack the wherewithal and human capital needed to mount a meaningful operation.  
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Cyberterrorism, they argued, was a thing of the future, although it might be pursued as an 
ancillary tool.  
 
The Monterey team defined three levels of cyberterror capability.  First is simple-unstructured: 
the capability to conduct basic hacks against individual systems using tools created by someone 
else.  The organization possesses little target analysis, command and control, or learning 
capability. 
 
Second is advanced-structured: the capability to conduct more sophisticated attacks against 
multiple systems or networks and possibly, to modify or create basic hacking tools.  The 
organization possesses an elementary target analysis, command and control, and learning 
capability. 
 
Third is complex-coordinated: the capability for a coordinated attacks capable of causing mass-
disruption against integrated, heterogeneous defenses (including cryptography).  The 
organization has the ability to create sophisticated hacking tools.  They possess a highly capable 
target analysis, command and control, and organization learning capability. 
 
The Monterey team estimated that it would take a group starting from scratch 2-4 years to reach 
the advanced-structured level and 6-10 years to reach the complex-coordinated level, although 
some groups might get there in just a few years or turn to outsourcing or sponsorship to extend 
their capability. 
 
The study examined five terrorist group types: religious, New Age, ethno-nationalist separatist, 
revolutionary, and far-right extremists.  They determined that only the religious groups are likely 
to seek the most damaging capability level, as it is consistent with their indiscriminate 
application of violence.  New Age or single issue terrorists, such as the Animal Liberation Front, 
pose the most immediate threat, however, such groups are likely to accept disruption as a 
substitute for destruction.  Both the revolutionary and ethno-nationalist separatists are likely to 
seek an advanced-structured capability.  The far-right extremists are likely to settle for a simple-
unstructured capability, as cyberterror offers neither the intimacy nor cathartic effects that are 
central to the psychology of far-right terror.  The study also determined that hacker groups are 
psychologically and organizationally ill-suited to cyberterrorism, and that it would be against 
their interests to cause mass disruption of the information infrastructure. 
 
Thus, at this time, cyberterrorism does not seem to pose an imminent threat.  This could change. 
For a terrorist, it would have some advantages over physical methods.  It could be conducted 
remotely and anonymously, and it would not require the handling of explosives or a suicide 
mission.  It would likely garner extensive media coverage, as journalists and the public alike are 
fascinated by practically any kind of computer attack.  Indeed cyberterrorism could be 
immensely appealing precisely because of the tremendous attention given to it by the 
government and media. 
 
Cyberterrorism also has its drawbacks.  Systems are complex, so it may be harder to control an 
attack and achieve a desired level of damage than using physical weapons.  Unless people are 
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injured, there is also less drama and emotional appeal.  Further, terrorists may be disinclined to 
try new methods unless they see their old ones as inadequate, particularly when the new methods 
require considerable knowledge and skill to use effectively.  Terrorists generally stick with tired 
and true methods.  Novelty and sophistication of attack may be much less important than 
assurance that a mission will be operationally successful.  Indeed, the risk of operational failure 
could be a deterrent to terrorists.  For now, the truck bomb poses a much greater threat than the 
logic bomb. 
 
The next generation of terrorists will grow up in a digital world, with ever more powerful and 
easy-to-use hacking tools at their disposal.  They might see greater potential for cyberterrorism 
than the terrorists of today, and their level of knowledge and skill relating to hacking will be 
greater.  Hackers and insiders might be recruited by terrorists or become self-recruiting 
cyberterrorists, the Timothy McVeigh=s of cyberspace.  Some might be moved to action by 
cyber policy issues, making cyberspace an attractive venue for carrying out an attack.  
Cyberterrorism could also become more attractive as the real and virtual worlds become more 
closely coupled, with a greater number of physical devices attached to the Internet.  Some of 
these may be remotely controlled.  Terrorists, for example, might target robots used in 
telesurgery.  Unless these systems are carefully secured, conducting an operation that physically 
harms someone may be easy as penetrating a Web site is today. 
 
Although the violent pursuit of political goals using exclusively electronic methods is likely to be 
at least a few years into the future, the more general threat of cybercrime is very much a part of 
the digital landscape today.   In addition to cyberattacks against digital data and systems, many 
people are being terrorized on the Internet today with threats of physical violence.  On-line 
stalking, death threats, and hate messages are abundant.  These crimes are serious and must be 
addressed.  In so doing, we will be in a better position to prevent and respond to cyberterrorism if 
and when the threat becomes more serious. 
__________________ 
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